


Sometimes it's better to be **STUCK!**


SAML Transportation Unit for Cryptographic Keys

28.11.2012

Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security
Chair for Network and Data Security



How to transport cryptographic keys ... if no tamed predator is available



Why transport key material?

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- Web Crypto API

“JavaScript API for performing basic cryptographic operations in web applications”

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- Authenticated Key Exchange
- Combining Identity Management/Federation and Key Exchange

Why choose SAML for key transport?

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- Flexible, extensive, **extensible**

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 - “*Security Assertion Markup Language*”
- Standard for exchanging security statements (**Assertions**) about subjects
 - Authentication / Authorization / Attestation / ...*
- XML-based
- Flexible, extensive, **extensible**
- Most known usage scenario: Single-Sign-On

Advantages of the proposal

Build upon approved technologies

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- XML

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- XML Encryption
- XML Signature

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- Usage of standard SAML Extension Points

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- Usage of standard SAML Extension Points
- No Schema violation
- Fully SAML compatible

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Binding keys to assertions

Assertions offer support for:

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- Detailed issuer and subject information
- Identity binding

Advantages of the proposal

Identity and Key federation

Advantages of the proposal

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- Key federation between multiple services

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Identity and Key federation

- Key federation between multiple services
- Inseparable Identity – Key Binding, beyond service borders

Advantages of the proposal

Message level security

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Message level security


- Security at message level

Advantages of the proposal

Message level security

- Security at message level

Transport Level Security



Message Level Security




STUCK

STUCK

Assertion structure

STUCK

Assertion structure




STUCK

Proposal: Proof-of-concept Assertion


STUCK

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
STUCK

Proposal: Compatibility with SAML Protocols




Case study

Sec² research project



Case study


Sec² research project



Case study

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
1. Middleware fetches (encrypted) data from untrusted Cloud storage



Case study

Sec² research project


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2. MicroSD not in possession of required key (yet)



Case study

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
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
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
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6. Middleware decrypts fetched data



Time for questions



Source: <http://www.rhodium-mineralwasser.de>

Christopher Meyer

christopher.meyer@rub.de

<http://armoredbarista.blogspot.com>

<http://www.nds.rub.de>