Re: What's up John­ny? – Co­vert Con­tent At­tacks on Email End-to-End En­cryp­ti­on

Jens Mül­ler, Mar­cus Brink­mann, Da­mi­an Pod­debni­ak, Se­bas­ti­an Schin­zel, Jörg Schwenk

17th In­ter­na­tio­nal Con­fe­rence on Ap­p­lied Cryp­to­gra­phy and Net­work Se­cu­ri­ty (ACNS 2019)


Ab­stract

We show prac­tical at­tacks against Open­PGP and S/MIME en­cryp­ti­on and di­gi­tal si­gna­tu­res in the con­text of email. In­s­tead of tar­ge­ting the un­der­ly­ing cryp­to­gra­phic pri­mi­ti­ves, our at­tacks abuse le­gi­ti­ma­te fea­tures of the MIME stan­dard and HTML, as sup­por­ted by email cli­ents, to de­cei­ve the user re­gar­ding the ac­tu­al mes­sa­ge con­tent. We de­mons­tra­te how the at­ta­cker can un­knowingly abuse the user as a de­cryp­ti­on ora­cle by re­ply­ing to an un­sus­pi­cious look­ing email. Using this tech­ni­que, the plain­text of hund­reds of en­cryp­ted emails can be lea­ked at once. Fur­ther­mo­re, we show how users could be tri­cked into si­gning ar­bi­tra­ry text by re­ply­ing to emails con­tai­ning CSS con­di­tio­nal rules. An eva­lua­ti­on shows that 17 out of 19 Open­PGP-ca­pa­ble email cli­ents, as well as 21 out of 22 cli­ents sup­porting S/MIME, are vul­nerable to at least one at­tack. We pro­vi­de dif­fe­rent coun­ter­me­a­su­res and di­s­cuss their ad­van­ta­ges and di­sad­van­ta­ges.

[draft ver­si­on] [ar­ti­facts]

Tags: De­cryp­ti­on Ora­cles, pgp, S/MIME, Si­gning Ora­cles